Sentencing: Capital Punishment by Short, Jodi L. & Spoto, Mark D.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law





UC Hastings College of the Law, shortj@uchastings.edu
Mark D. Spoto
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation















addition, the defendant may not receive credit when she will serve the federal
sentence consecutively with the state sentence.
2264
David McGovern




Proportionality. Although the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment does not prohibit capital punishment,2 65 it does prohibit death
sentences that are disproportionate for certain crimes or individuals. 2 66 To
determine'whether a particular sentence is excessive, traditionally the Court
examines society's views of the challenged punishment as expressed by objec-
tive evidence of community values, including legislative judgments, 2 67 sen-
Cir. 1991) (government has burden of establishing that defendant not entitled to credit where
federal appeals bond was revoked as result of state arrest).
2264. See Pinaud v. James, 851 F.2d 27, 31-32 (2d Cir. 1988) (time served under state sentence
later vacated does not apply toward unrelated federal sentence when state and federal sentences
to be served consecutively); U.S. v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1981) (same); Sinito v.
Kindt, 954 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir.) (per curiam) (time served under initial sentence from date of
habeas appeal to date of longer concurrent sentence may not be applied to longer sentence), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 2316 (1992); Cox v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 643 F.2d 534, 537 (8th Cir. 1981)
(per curiam) (time served under state sentence does not entitle defendant to federal credit
because federal sentence not concurrent to state sentence); Meagher v. Clark, 943 F.2d 1277,
1282-83 (11th Cir. 1991) (time served under state sentence later vacated does not apply toward
federal sentence even if sentences intended under original plea bargain to run concurrently).
2265. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (plurality opinion). Gregg was the first death
penalty challenge to reach the Court after Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam),
struck down existing state death penalty statutes. In Furman, all nine Justices filed separate
opinions, but several dominant themes emerged from the fragmented five-to-feur decision. Only
Justices Brennan and Marshall found capital punishment unconstitutional per se. Id. at 305
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 370-72 (Marshall, J., concurring). Three other concurring
Justices were concerned that unfettered jury discretion in imposing the death penalty led to its
arbitrary exercise. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 313 (White, J., concurring). The four dissenters urged deference to legislative judgment as the
most reliable indicator of social values. Id. at 385 (Burger, C.J., Blackmun, Powell & Rehnquist,
JJ., dissenting).
2266. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834 (1988) (plurality opinion) ("punishment
should be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant" (quoting
California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring))); Tison v. Arizona, 481
U.S. 137, 149 (1987) ("The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal sentence must be
directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.").
2267. Compare Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1989) (plurality opinion) (majority
of states permitting capital punishment for 16-year-olds sufficient to show absence of national
consensus against the practice and supports holding that practice does not violate Eighth
Amendment); Tison, 481 U.S. at 154 (several states authorizing death penalty for felony murder
regardless of intent to kill "powerfully suggests" society does not reject death penalty in those
circumstances and supports holding that practice does not violate Eighth Amendment) and
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179-80 (plurality opinion) (35 states reenacting capital punishment statutes in
response to Furman indicates social endorsement of death penalty for murder and supports
holding that death penalty for murder does not under all circumstances violate Eighth Amend-
1994] 1199
HeinOnline  -- 82 Geo. L.J. 1199 1993-1994
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
tences imposed by juries,2268 public opinion,2269 and international practices.2270
By linking interpretation of the Eighth Amendment to this evidence, the Court
seeks to give effect to "the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society. ' 22 71 The Court also engages in an independent
ment) with Thompson, 487 U.S. at 823-29, 833-38 (plurality opinion) (state legislation relating to
rights and duties of children compared with those of adults and state legislation authorizing
capital punishment supports holding that imposition of death penalty on 15-year-old offender
violates Eighth Amendment); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 408 (1986) (fact that no state
legislature permits execution of insane supports holding that execution of insane defendant
violates Eighth Amendment); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1982) (state legislative
judgment against imposing death penalty for unintended felony murder, although not dispositive,
supports holding that capital punishment for that offense violates Eighth Amendment) and Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 594 (1977) (plurality opinion) (fact that no other state legislature
authorizes death penalty for rape of an adult woman supports holding that death penalty for rape
violates Eighth Amendment).
The Court has stressed that legislative judgments are "the clearest and most reliable objective
evidence" of community values. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); see also Stanford, 492
U.S. at 370-71 (plurality opinion) ("'first' among the 'objective indicia that reflect the public
attitude toward a given sanction' are statutes passed by society's elected representatives" (quot-
ing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987))); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 174-75 & n.19 (plurality
opinion) (legislative judgment weighs heavily, hut not dispositive in ascertaining community
values).
2268. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 (plurality opinion) (noting that "[ihe jury ... is a significant
and reliable objective index of contemporary values" in holding death penalty for murder not
unconstitutional in all circumstances); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 831-32 (plurality opinion) (noting
that juries imposed death sentences on juvenile offenders so infrequently as to "lead[) to the
unambiguous conclusion that imposition of the death penalty on a 15-year-old offender is now
generally abhorrent to the conscience of the community" and thus unconstitutional); Enmund,
458 U.S. at 794 (noting that juries imposed death penalty upon nontriggerman felony murderers
in only six of 362 capital cases since 1954 in holding death sentence for driver of getaway car
unconstitutional); Coker, 433 U.S. at 597 (plurality opinion) (noting that juries did not impose
death penalty for rape in vast majority of cases in holding death penalty for rape unconstitu-
tional).
2269. Compare Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830 & nn.32 & 33 (plurality opinion) (considering
formal opposition of American Bar Association and American Law Institute to death penalty for
juveniles in holding death penalty unconstitutional for 15-year-old offender) and Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298 n.34 (1976) (plurality opinion) (considering survey of opinion
polls suggesting public does not support mandatory death penalty in holding mandatory death
penalty statute unconstitutional) with Gregg, 428 U.S. at 181 & n.25 (plurality opinion) (consider-
ing state constitutional referenda, ballot measures, and popular opinion polls supporting capital
punishment in finding death penalty for murder not unconstitutional in all circumstances).
2270. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830-31 & nn.31 & 34 (plurality opinion) (considering
international opinion and practices expressed in statutes and treaties of Anglo-American and
Western European nations in holding death penalty unconstitutional for 15-year-old offenders);
Coker, 433 U.S. at 596 n.10 (plurality opinion) (considering survey by United Nations in which
only three of 60 nations surveyed retained death penalty for rape unaccompanied by killing in
holding death penalty for rape unconstitutional).
2271. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173 (plurality opinion) (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (plurality opinion)). The baseline for discussion of the "evolving standards of decency"
has often been common law views of the challenged punishment. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 368
(plurality opinion) (reviewing common law treatment of juvenile offenders to find execution of
16- and 17-year-old offenders constitutional); Penry, 492 U.S. at 331-33 (reviewing common law
treatment of "idiots" and "lunatics" to find execution of mentally retarded defendants constitu-
tional); Ford, 477 U.S. at 406-08 (reviewing long standing common law bar in England and
America against executing prisoner who has become insane in holding execution of insane
defendant unconstitutional). To successfully challenge a punishment accepted at common law, a
1200 [Vol. 82:1153
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proportionality review, analyzing whether a particular sentence "amounts to
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or is grossly disproportionate to
the severity of the offense."
2272
By considering these factors, the Court has held that there are classes of
offenses for which the imposition of the death penalty is unconstitutionally
severe. In Coker v. Georgia,2273 the Court held that the death penalty was
disproportionate punishment for the cime of raping an adult woman.2274 A
plurality of the Court reasoned that capital punishment is excessive when the
life of the victim has not been taken. 27s The Court has applied this same
reasoning to invalidate death sentences ior the crimes of robbery and kidnap-
ping.
2276
In addition, the death penalty has been found unconstitutional for certain
categories of defendants prosecuted under felony murder statutes. The Court
held in Enmund v. Florida22 7 that the death penalty is unconstitutional for one
who "does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or
that lethal force will be employed. ' 2278 In Tison v. Arizona, 2279 however, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty for those who, al-
though not intending that a killing take place, exhibit a "reckless disregard for
human life." 2 "0 The Court found that society has approved the death penalty
defendant must show that it is cruel and unusual by current standards; in doing so, the defendant
must demonstrate the existence of a national consensus against the punishment, not the absence
of a national consensus in favor of it. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 373 (plurality opinion).
2272. Coker, 433 U.S. at 592 (plurality opinion) (death penalty disproportionate to crime when
imposed for rape). If a punishment fails to further penological goals of retribution or deterrence,
it amounts to the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798; Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981). •
Federal courts have rejected challenges asserting that various methods of execution are cruel
and unusual because of their alleged unnecessary and wanton painfulness. See In re Kemmler,
136 U.S. 436, 444-49 (1890) (execution by electrocution not unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain); O'Bryan v. McKaskle, 729 F.2d 991, 994 (5th Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (execution by lethal
injection not unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain).
2273. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
2274. Id. at 598-600 (plurality opinion); id. at 601 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment in part &
dissenting in part) ("ordinarily death is disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an
adult woman").
2275. Id. at 598 (plurality opinion).
2276. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 (death penalty disproportionate for robbery in which victim
not killed); Hooks v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (per curiam) (same).
2277. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
2278. Id. at 797.
2279. 481 U.S. 137 (1987).
2280. Id. at 157-58. In Tison, the Supreme Court articulated two key factors in imposing the
death penalty: the degree of participation in the felony committed and the defendant's state of
mind. Id. at 156-58; see Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 79 (1987) (potentially differing degrees of
participation in crime of persons convicted of murder important consideration in invalidating
mandatory capital punishment statute); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (culpability of individual
defendant focal concern in determining validity of death sentence); Greenawalt v. Ricketts, 943
F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant's active participation in prison break that resulted
in three murders and four kidnappings exhibited requisite "reckless indifference" to qualify for
death penalty), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 252 (1992); Cave v. Singletary, 971 F.2d 1513, 1530 (11th
HeinOnline  -- 82 Geo. L.J. 1201 1993-1994
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for defendants with such a culpable mental state2281 and that the goals of
retribution and deterrence are met by executing this subset of felony murder-
ers.28 2 The Tison majority narrowly construed Enmund to prohibit the death
penalty only for those felony murderers who lack intent to kill and play a
minor role in the crime.2 83 The Court also read Enmund as explicitly permit-
ting capital punishment in all cases in which the defendant intends to kill.2284
Finding that the defendants in Tison fit neither of these two categories, the
Court articulated the "reckless disregard" standard, an intermediate mental
state short of intent for which the death penalty could permissibly be imposed.'
The death penalty may also be disproportionate when applied to certain
classes of individuals, regardless of the nature of their crimes. in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,2286 the Supreme Court held that the imposition of the death
penalty on a defendant who was fifteen years old at the time he committed the
murder violated the Eighth Amendment.z 87 Yet, in Stanford v. Kentucky,2288
Cir. 1992) (defendant's involvement in armed robbery and kidnapping that included holding gun
on victim and indifference to victim's plight allowed imposition of death penalty).
2281. Tison, 481 U.S. at 154. The Court noted that, despite Enmund, 21 states still authorized
the death penalty for felony murderers who were major actors in a crime in which they knew a
death was likely to occur. Id. at 152-54. The majority found that "[t]his substantial and recent
legislative authorization ... powerfully suggests that our society does not reject the death penalty
as grossly excessive under these circumstances." Id. at 154.
2282. Id. at 148-49, 157-58. In Eninund, the Court reasoned that the death penalty will not
deter one who does not kill or has no intention that life be taken and that such a person is not
morally culpable enough to merit retribution. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-801. The Tison majority
noted that the Enmund Court relied heavily on the fact that robberies only rarely escalate into
murder and that the deterrent value of capital punishment would be substantially different for
robberies in which there is a substantial likelihood that a killing will occur. Tison, 481 U.S. at
148-49. Calling personal culpability "[t]he heart of the retribution rationale," id. at 149, the Tison
Court found that the reckless disregard for human life manifest in "knowingly engaging in
criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state"
justifying retribution. Id. at 157.
2283. Tison, 481 U.S. at 151.
2284. Id.
2285. Id. at 157-58.
2286. 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion).
2287. Id. at 838. A plurality of four Justices would have invalidated the death penalty for
crimes committed by offenders under age 16 by finding such punishment offensive to civilized
standards of decency. Id. at 821-23. The plurality rejected the view that the existence of death
penalty statutes with no minimum age for execution implied that "current standards of decency
would still tolerate the execution of 10-year-old children." Id. at 826-29. In support of its finding
of a national consensus against such executions, the plurality noted the extreme infrequency with
which death sentences were imposed on those under 16 and the even rarer frequency with which
execution actually occurred. Id. at 832-33. The plurality ultimately concluded that the penological
goals of retribution and deterrence were not advanced by such a penalty. Id. at 836-38.
Justice O'Connor, concurring in the judgment, concluded that because Thompson's death
sentence might have resulted from the inadvertent interaction of two Oklahoma statutes, one
authorizing capital punishment without setting any minimum age for death-eligibility and the
other providing that in some cases a 15-year-old may be tried as an adult, the death sentence
lacked the "careful consideration that we have required for other kinds of decisions leading to
the death penalty." Id. at 857 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor did not agree with
the plurality that a national consensus against such executions had been demonstrated. Id.
2288. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
1202 [Vol. 82:1153
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the Court upheld the imposition of the death penalty on a person who was
sixteen years old at the time of the murder. 2 Finding "neither a historical
nor a modern societal consensus forbidding the imposition" of the death
penalty on minors older than fifteen who commit murder, the Court held that
the punishment did not violate the Eighth Amendment. 290 In a departure
from settled Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, however, a plurality of four
Justices expressed willingness to limit the proportionality inquiry to the ques-
tion of how society views the challenged punishment.229" '
The Supreme Court has also addressed death penalty challenges based on
competency. In Ford v. Wainwright,2292 the Court held that the Eighth Amend-
ment prohibits the execution of a prisoner who becomes insane while awaiting
execution.2291 In Penry v. Lynaugh,2294 however, the Court rejected the claim
that a moderately mentally retarded person lacked the mental culpability
necessary to justify the imposition of the death penalty. Finding only one state
that explicitly banned the execution of the mentally retarded, the Court
2289. Id. at 380 (plurality opinion).
2290. Id.; id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment). A plurality of
four Justices, joined by Justice O'Connor, aggregated the 19 states that set no minimum age in
their death penalty statutes with the three states that expressly permitted the execution of
16-year-olds and the one state that implicitly allowed the practice to find that a majority of states
that permitted capital punishment authorized the execution of 16-year-olds. Id. at 370 (majority
opinion); id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring). These five Justices also found that the
infrequency with which the death penalty was sought for and imposed on minors could be
explained by the small number of capital crimes committed by minors, as well as jury consider-
ation of age as a mitigating factor. Id. at 373-74 (majority opinion); id. at 381-82 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
2291. Id. at 377-80 (plurality opinion). The plurality rejected the contention that "socioscientific"
evidence proffered by amici curiae on the psychological and emotional development of 16- and
17-year-olds was relevant to the Court's consideration of the death penalty as applied to
juveniles: "The audience for these arguments.., is not this Court but the citizenry of the United
States." Id. at 378. The plurality also refused to consider age-based statutory classifications in
other areas of the law as relevant to the appropriateness of imposing the death penalty. Id. at
376-77.
2292. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
2293. Id. at 409-10. The Court held that executing a person "whose mental illness prevents him
from comprehending the reasons for the penalty or its implications" was cruel and unusual
punishment because it was incompatible with evolving standards of decency and did not contrib-
ute to the penological goals of retribution or deterrence. Id. at 408-10, 417 (plurality opinion); id.
at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part & concurring in judgment). The Court noted that a legacy of
historical opposition to this practice was bolstered by the modern fact that no state currently
permitted such executions. -d. at 408-10 & n.2 (majority opinion); see Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d
570, 572-73 (8th Cir.) (defendant competent to be executed under Ford despite failure to meet
American Bar Association competency standard that asks additionally "whether the convict
possesses the ability to inform counsel or the court of any fact which might exist which would
make the punishment unjust or unlawful"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2872 (1991).
The Court has also upheld against a due process challenge a state statute which created a
presumption that a defendant was competent and placed the burden of proving otherwise by a
preponderance of the evidence upon the defendant. Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992).
The Court noted the need to show "substantial deference" toward legislative judgments in
matters of criminal procedure. Id. at 2577.
2294. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
1994] 1203
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concluded that there was insufficient evidence of a national consensus in
opposition to such punishment.2295
Statutory Capital Punishment Schemes. The Supreme Court has required
heightened reliability in the imposition of the death penalty,21 96 but has not
mandated states to adopt any particular statutory approach to capital punish-
ment." 7 To minimize the risk of arbitrary action and provide individualized
sentencing, the Court has imposed two general requirements on the capital
sentencing piocess. First, a state must channel the sentencer's discretion 229 8 in
order to "genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty
2295. Id. at 334-35. The majority opinion by Justice O'Connor also examined the common law
treatment of individuals with diminished mental capacities and concluded that only th6se
presently qualifying for the insanity defense were exempt from capital punishment. Id. at 332.
These findings were sufficient for four concurring Justices to conclude that the execution of a
mentally retarded person did not violate the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 351 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist,
C.J., & White & Kennedy, JJ., concurring in part & dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor further
concluded that evidence proffered by the American Association on Mental Retardation was
insufficient to establish that mentally retarded persons "lack the cognitive, volitional, and moral
capacity to act with the degree of culpability associated with the death penalty." Id. at 338
(plurality opinion).
2296. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1988) ("qualitative difference between
death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is
imposed" (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (plurality opinion))); Dobbs v. Zant,
113 S. Ct. 835, 836 (1993) (per curiam) (emphasizing "the importance of reviewing capital
sentences on a complete record"); cf. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 10 (1989) (plurality
opinion) (Eighth Amendment does not require states to provide counsel to prisoners seeking
state collateral review because heightened procedural safeguards at trial stage of death penalty
cases ensure reliability).
The defendant must be given adequate notice that the death penalty might be imposed at
sentencing. Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723, 1733 & n.22 (1991). In Lankford, the prosecutor
had formally advised the judge and the defendant that the state would not recommend the death
penalty for defendant's murder conviction, and the death penalty was not discussed during the
sentencing hearing. Id. at 1726-27. Under these circumstances, the Court found that "[pletitioner's
lack of adequate notice that the judge was contemplating the imposition of the death sentence
created an impermissible risk that the adversary process may have malfunctioned in this case."
Id. at 1733.
2297. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464 (1984) ("[tjhe Eighth Amendment is not
violated every time a State reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how
best to administer its criminal laws"); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874-75 (1983) ("each
distinct system must be examined on an individual basis" (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 195 (1976) (plurality opinion))).
2298. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion). The Court has stated
that the need to channel the sentencer's discretion was the "fundamental principle" of Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), which struck down all of the then existing state death
penalty statutes. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 302 (1987). This principle was reaffirmed in
Gregg: "where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination
of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and
limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Gregg, 428 U.S. at
189 (plurality opinion). In Godfrey, the Court outlined three criteria to determine whether a
statutory scheme effectively channels a sentencer's discretion. Each scheme must provide (1)
"clear and objective standards," (2) "specific and detailed guidance," and (3) an opportunity for
rational review of the "process for imposing a sentence of death." Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428
(plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 82:11531204
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and ... [thus] reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on
the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder. '2299 Second, the
state may not limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant evidence that
might lead the sentencer to decline to impose the death penalty. 30 0
The required narrowing of the class of death-eligible defendants may occur
at either the guilt or the sentencing phase of a capital trial.230 ' When narrow-
ing is accomplished during the sentencing phase, the sentencer"0 2 determines
whether certain characteristics of the crime, known as aggravating circum-
stances, distinguish the gravity of the offense so as to justify the imposition of
2299. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877. When statutory procedures prevent arbitrary application of
the death penalty by adequately channelling the sentencer's discretion, a capital defendant does
not have a Constitutional right to proportionality review of her individual sentence. McCleskey,
481 U.S. at 306-07; Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43-45 (1984); see Evans v. McCotter, 790 F.2d
1232, 1243 (5th Cir.) (Texas capital punishment scheme protects against arbitrary and capricious
imposition of death penalty; proportionality review unnecessary), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922
(1986). Because proportionality review is not constitutionally required, states that do conduct
these reviews are given great latitude in their focus and extent. See Barfield v. Harris, 719 F.2d
58, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1983) (North Carolina court's proportionality review constitutionally sufficient
despite lack of identification of cases used for comparison purposes and lack of systematic means
for identifying and retrieving appropriate cases for comparison), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210
(1984); Prejean v. Maggio, 765 F.2d 482, 483-84 (5th Cir. 1985) (Louisiana Supreme Court's
single district proportionality review constitutionally sufficient even though court had engaged in
broader search for similar cases in other instances), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 925 (1989); McKenzie v.
Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1542-43 & n.37 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (Montana Supreme Court's proportion-
ality review constitutionally sufficient even though no statutory provision described type of review
to be undertaken by state appellate courts), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988); Lindsey v. Smith,
820 F.2d 1137, 1154 (11th Cir. 1987) (Alabama appellate courts' proportionality review cohstitu-
tionally sufficient even though courts' opinions provided no explicit account of such review), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989).
2300. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982) (invalidating death penalty statute
permitting consideration of only three mitigating circumstances); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 606-07
(plurality opinion) (same).
The Court has invalidated state statutes that require imposition of the death penalty as the
mandatory punishment for certain categories of murder. See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66,
81-82 (1987) (invalidating mandatory death penalty statute because unconstitutionally failed to
consider defendants' criminal record or factors affecting state of mind); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (invalidating mandatory death penalty
statute because failed to consider defendants' character and record and circumstances of particu-
lar offense).
2301. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 244-45.
2302. Either a judge or jury may act as sentencer, even when the sentence turns on specific
findings of fact. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 745 (1990) ("Any argument that the
Constitution requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite
to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by... this Court."); see Walton v.
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990) (upholding capital sentencing schemes that provide for no jury
involvement at sentencing stage); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 459-60 (objectives of "measured, consis-
tent application and fairness to the accused" do not require imposition of death penalty by jury).
The Court has consistently upheld the validity of advisory jury verdicts that are subject to
judicial override. See Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989) (per curiam) (Sixth
Amendment not violated by judicial imposition of death sentence following jury's advisory
verdict); Baldwin v. Alabama, 472 U.S. 372, 388-89 (1985) (Eighth Amendment not violated by
jury advisory opinion subject to override by sentencing judge); Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 465-67
(same).
1994] 1205
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the death penalty.23 " Although the sentencer may consider both statutorily
defined and nonstatutory aggravating circumstances,"a° the death penalty may
not be imposed without the finding of at least one statutorily defined aggravat-
ing circumstance.230'
However, states may differ in considering the significance of aggravating
circumstances after finding a defendant to be death-eligible.230 6 Some states
require that the sentencer "weigh" the aggravating circumstances against the
mitigating circumstances. Others merely require that the sentencer find a
proper aggravating circumstance and then, in determining whether the death
penalty should be applied, consider all circumstances before it.23 7
2303. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 878 (statutory aggravating circumstances "circumscribe the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty"). Although the use of aggravating circumstances was
initially justified as a way to guide the sentencer's discretion, it appears that the Court now views
them solely as a means to establish death-eligibility. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299
(1990), the Court held that a state could preclude a sentencer from evaluating the weight of a
particular aggravating circumstance and noted that "[t]he presence of aggravating circumstances
serves the purpose of limiting the class of death-eligible defendants, and the Eighth Amendment
does not require that these aggravating circumstances be further refined or weighed by a jury." Id. at 306-07.
2304. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 878; see Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 256-57 & n.14 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (upholding sentence based on combination of statutory and nonstatutory
circumstances); Lesko v. Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 59 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding sentence based on jury
finding of two statutory aggravating circumstances when jury also considered nonstatutory aggra-
vating circumstances), cert. denied, 493 U S. 1036 (1990); Henry v. Wainwright, 721 F.2d 990, 994
(5th Cir. 1983) (upholding sentence based on statutory aggravating circumstances when jury also
considered nonstatutory aggravating evidence of defendant resisting arrest and shooting police
officer as officer knelt on ground begging not to be shot), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993 (1984);
Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 451 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding sentence based on jury finding of
only one statutory aggravating circumstance when jury also considered nonstatutory aggravating
factors), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1609 (1993).
In Stephens, the Court noted that the defendant's prior criminal history was properly before the
jury as an aggravating circumstance because it described relevant elements of the defendant's
background. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 886-88; see James v. Butler, 827 F.2d 1006, 1012-14 (5th Cir.
1987) (defendant's previous conviction for murder admissible as nonstatutory aggravating factor
despite fact that statutory aggravating circumstance concerning prior history of crime partially or
wholly invalid), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1046 (1988). An invalid conviction, however, may not be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1988).
The Eleventh Circuit has permitted consideration of the defendant's being on parole when the
murder was committed as an aggravating factor. Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d 1137, 1153 (11th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989). The Third Circuit has sustained the constitutionality of
death sentences based in part on evidence of unadjudicated or unconvicted offenses. Lesko v.
Owens, 881 F.2d 44, 56-59 (3d Cir. 1989) (other offenses perpetrated in conjunction with offense
being sentenced properly before jury because they aided jury's individualized assessment of
defendant's character and appropriateness of death penalty), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036 (1990).
2305. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 876-79 & n.14; see Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 957 (1983)
(plurality opinion) (reading Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (plurality opinion), as
questioning propriety of sentence based entirely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances).
2306. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1136-40 (1992).
2307. Id. at 1136. The difference between statutory schemes that allow sentencers to "weigh"
aggravating circumstances versus mitigating circumstances and nonweighing schemes-is of "criti-
cal importance" on review. Id. For example, the prohibition of Godfrey and of Maynard v.
Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356 (1988), against death sentences that are based in part upon impermissi-
bly vague aggravating circumstances does not, apply in nonweighing states in which at least one
other valid aggravating circumstance is found. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1137. Because in weighing
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In a weighing state in which the jury acts as the sentencer, greater emphasis
is placed upon limiting the scope of aggravating circumstances that fail to
channel the jury's discretion, °8 such as impermissibly vague statutory defini-
tions of aggravating circumstances. 2" A narrowing instruction to the jury,"'
however, or the adoption of a narrowing construction on appellate review can
states the sentencerbalances the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating, any improper
aggravating circumstances upset this process and require substantially greater judicial review in
order to cure the defect. Id.
2308. In Stringer, the Supreme Court held that an invalid, vague aggravating circumstance so
infected the weighing process that the defendant was unconstitutionally deprived of the individu-
alized sentencing mandated by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 1138-39. Decisions based on invalid
aggravating .circumstances must be reversed because they "create[] the possibility.., of
randomness," id. at 1139, and thus may skew the weighing process by placing a "thumb ... [on)
death's side of the scale," id. at 1137, "creatfing] the risk [of] treat[ing] the defendant as more
deserving of the death penalty," or by "creat[ing] the possibility.., of bias in favor of the death
penalty," id. at 1139.
2309. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 358-59, 363-64 (1988) (statutory aggravating
circumstance for "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" murder unconstitutionally vague). In
Godfrey, the Court overturned a death sentence when the trial court instruction gave the jury no
guidance concerning the meaning of Georgia's "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and
inhuman" aggravating circumstance. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428-29 (plurality opinion); id. at 435
(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., concurring in judgment). Four Justices found nothing in the words that
implied "any inherent restraint on the arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death sentence"
and concluded that the instruction made the jury's interpretation of the phrase "the subject of
sheer speculation." Id. at 428-29 (plurality opinion). Compare Wilcher v. Hargett, 978 F.2d 872,
879 (5th Cir. 1992) (Mississippi statutory aggravating circumstance for "especially heinous,
atrocious or cruel" murder unconstitutionally vague as written and construed), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 96 (1993) and Moore v. Clarke, 951 F.2d 895, 896-97 (8th Cir. 1991) (Nebraska statutory
aggravating circumstance for "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel or manifested exceptional
depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence" unconstitutionally vague as written
and construed), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1995 (1992) with Jeffries v. Blodgett, 988 F.2d 923, 936
(9th Cir.) (Washington statutory aggravating circumstance employing terms "crime" and "plan or
scheme" not unconstitutionally vague), amended, 5 F.3d 1180 (1993), and petition for cert. filed,
62 U.S.L.W. 3430 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1993) (No. 93-971).
2310. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). In Walton, the Supreme Court stated that juries
must be instructed in more than "bare terms" regarding vague aggravating circumstances
because, unlike judges, juries are not presumed to know the law and be able to apply narrow
definitions of vague aggravating circumstances. Id. at 653 (dictum). Compare Shell v. Mississippi,
498 U.S. 1, 1 (1990) (per curiam) (limiting instruction defining "especially heinous, atrocious or
cruel" aggravating circumstance in Mississippi death penalty statute as extremely wicked and
indifferently inflicting high degree of pain did not provide enough guidance for jury) and Newlon
v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1334 (8th Cir. 1989) (judge's refusal to give limiting instruction
regarding "depravity of mind" aggravating circumstance did not provide enough guidance for
jury), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) with Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 773 (1990) (limiting
instruction narrowing Arizona death penalty statute's "especially heinous, cruel and depraved"
aggravating circumstance to class of murderers who inflict gratuitous violence and commit
murder with relish, provided sufficient guidance for jury); Boggs v. Bair, 892 F.2d 1193, 1197-98
(4th Cir. 1989) (limiting instruction regarding "vileness" aggravating circumstance, which told
jury to consider number and nature of batteries inflicted on victim, provided sufficient guidance
for jury), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 940 (1990) and Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 971-72 (11th Cir.
1983) (limiting instruction defining "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman" aggra-
vating circumstance to require both depravity of mind and torture of victim provided sufficient
guidance for jury), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
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cure such a constitutional defect."' In Zant v. Stephens,23 2 the Court upheld
a death sentence even though one of the three statutory aggravating circum-
stances applied by the jury was unconstitutionally vague."' The Court rea-
soned that the two valid aggravating circumstances adequately and objectively
narrowed the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty.' 14 Thus, if the
sentencer has relied on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating circum-
stance, an appellate court need not remand for a new sentencing determina-
tion, but may reweigh the evidence or conduct harmless error analysis to
uphold a death sentence.' 1 However, reweighing will not cure a constitu-
tional sentencing error unless the reviewing court "actually perform[s] a new
sentencing calculus." 2316 In a nonweighing state, a reviewing court must deter-
2311. Cartwright, 486 U.S. at 460; Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 432 (plurality opinion). In Cartwright, a
unanimous Court invalidated a death sentence based on Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atro-
cious, or cruel" aggravating circumstance. 486 U.S. at 360. The Court found that the wording was
unconstitutionally vague, no guiding instruction had been given to the jury, and no narrowing
construction had been adopted by the appellate court. Id. In Proffitt, however, the Court upheld a
death sentence imposed under an "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" aggravating circum-
stance because the Florida Supreme Court had construed the language so as to limit its
application to conscienceless or pitiless crimes unnecessarily torturous to victims. 428 U.S. at
255-56 (plurality opinion). In Arave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 1534 (1993), the Court upheld an Idaho
statute with an aggravating circumstance for "utter disregard for human life" because of the state
supreme court's limiting construction of the language to mean "cold-blooded, pitiless slayer." Id.
at 1541. The Court held that by construing the factor to mean "cold-blooded," the state supreme
court had constitutionally narrowed the class-of defendants eligible for the death penalty to "the
subclass of defendants who kill without feeling or sympathy." Id. at 1543.
A defendant may lose the right to appeal the use of an impermissibly vague aggravating
circumstance to federal court if state law requires an objection to preserve the issue for appeal
and the defendant fails to object in a timely fashion. See Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114,
2119-20 (1992) (U.S. Supreme Court lacked authority to address defendant's claim based on jury
instruction on "heinousness" factor when state supreme court's decision rested on adequate and
independent state ground that defendant had not preserved claim for appeal).
2312. 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
2313. Id. at 867; see Barclay, 463 U.S. at 956-58 (plurality opinion) (erroneous finding of
aggravating circumstance harmless error because of existence of other valid aggravating circum-
stances).
2314. Stephens, 462 U.S. at 879-80.
2315. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 747-49. In Clemons, the Court upheld the reweighing process as a
means of promoting "reliability and consistency" in the imposition of the death penalty. Id. at
749. The Court stated that harmless error analysis is also constitutionally permissible. Id. at
752-53. Nevertheless, the Court vacated the lower court's affirmance of a death sentence because
it was unclear whether the state appellate court had correctly employed either method. Id. at
751-52. But cf. Rust v. Hopkins, 984 F.2d 1486, 1493-95 (8th Cir. 1993) (reweighing of aggravating
and mitigating factors must be done by sentencing court rather than reviewing court to preserve
two-tier structure of review when sentencing error produced by heightening of standard of proof
for aggravating factors to beyond a reasonable doubt).
2316. Richmond v. Lewis, 113 S. Ct. 528, 535 (1992). In Richmond, the defendant's death
sentence was tainted by the sentencing judge's consideration of an unconstitutionally vague
aggravating factor. Id. at 537. The Court held that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to cure this
error when two concurring justices did not actually reweigh the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Id. at 535-37.
In Stringer, the Court was explicit that the reviewing court must reconsider the entire mix of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented to the jury. 112 S. Ct. at 1136-37. The Court
noted that it had "not suggested that the Eighth Amendment permits the state appellate court in
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mine that the invalid factor did not affect the jury's determination. 1
7
Some states permit imposition of the death penalty under a sentencing
scheme in which one or more statutory aggravating circumstances are identical
to the essential elements of the defendant's underlying capital crime. In
Lowenfield v. Phelps,"' z a death sentence imposed under such a statute was
challenged on the grounds that the jury could "merely repeat" one of its
findings from the guilt phase." 9 The Court upheld the statute, reasoning that
the required narrowing function had occurred at the guilt phase as a result of
the legislature's definition of the criminal offense. 2 '
The second constitutional requirement for a state statutory scheme is that it
must permit the consideration of all relevant mitigating evidence. 2 ' In Lock-
a weighing state to affirm a death sentence without a thorough analysis of the role an invalid
aggravating factor played in the sentencing process." Id. at 1136; see Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d
86, 92-95 (5th Cir. 1992) (finding unconstitutional state supreme court review that only limited
vague aggravating circumstance without reweighing other circumstances).
Similarly, in Parker v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991), the Court reversed a lower court's
affirmance of a death sentence because the lower court failed to consider mitigating circum-
stances when reweighing the evidence. Id. at 322. The trial court had not explicitly discussed
nonstatutory mitigating circumstances in its sentencing order, but the Court found evidence of
such circumstances in the record. Id.; see Jones v. Murray, 947 F.2d 1106, 1119-20 (4th Cir. 1991)
(sentencing court need not specifically address mitigating circumstances if record, taken as whole,
cannot be said to have left reasonable juror without vehicle to consider mitigating circum-
stances), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1591 (1992); Clark v. Ricketts, 942 F.2d 567, 574-75 (9th Cir.
1991) (sentencing court need not discuss all relevant mitigating circumstances in its written
findings if record shows that such circumstances considered), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 117 (1992).
In Sochor, the Court invalidated a state court decision in which it was unclear whether the state
court had undertaken harmless error analysis. 112 S. Ct. at 2123. The Court stated that
"[allthough we do not mean ... to require a particular formulaic indication by state courts before
their review for harmless error will pass federal scrutiny, a plain statement that the judgment
survives on such an enquiry is clearly preferable to allusions by citation." Id.; see Smith v. Dixon,
996 F.2d 667, 675 (4th Cir. 1993) (state supreme court did not remedy vagueness error because it
did not articulate narrowing construction it employed); Jeffers v. Lewis, 974 F.2d 1075, 1083-84
(9th Cir. 1992) (state supreme court did not remedy vagueness error in sentencing because it
failed to reweigh).
2317. Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1137.
2318. 484 U.S. 231 (1988).
2319. Id. at 241.
2320. Id. at 246. In Lowenjfield, the jury found the defendant guilty of first-degree murder, a
capital offense defined under the Louisiana statute as murder with a "specific intent to kill or to
inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person." Id. at 243. The single aggravating factor
found by the jury and upheld by the Louisiana Supreme Court was that the defendant "knowingly
created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person." Id. The Supreme Court
held that when aggravating circumstances act as a means of narrowing the class of death-eligible
defendants at the guilt phase, all that is constitutionally required at the sentencing phase is a
consideration of mitigating factors. Id. at 246; see Byrne v. Butler, 845 F.2d 501, 515 n.12 (5th
Cir.) (narrowing function may occur at guilt phase when aggravating circumstance identical to
element of crime of which defendant convicted), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1242 (1988); McKenzie v.
Risley, 842 F.2d 1525, 1539-41 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (narrowing function performed by statute
providing that homicide by means of torture and aggravated kidnapping punishable by death; list
of aggravating factors not required), cer. denied, 488 U.S. 901 (1988).
2321. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987) (" 'the sentencer' may not refuse to
consider or 'be precluded from considering' any relevant mitigating evidence" (quoting Skipper v.
1994] 1209
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ett v. Ohio, a" the Court held that a statute may not preclude the sentencer
from giving independent weight to evidence of the defendant's character and
record or the circumstances of the offense that might justify a less severe
penalty than death. 23  In Eddings v. Oklahoma,2324 the Court reversed a death
sentence because the sentencing judge refused to review nonstatutory mitigat-
ing evidence. 2" To establish that a sentencing jury has been impermissibly
constrained, however, the defendant must show a "reasonable likelihood that
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 4 (1986))); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 110 (same); Locket, 438 U.S. at
606-07 (plurality opinion) (same).
2322. 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (plurality opinion).
2323. Id. at 605 (plurality opinion). The Court has reversed death sentences when different
types of relevant mitigating evidence have been excluded. See Hitchcock, 481 U.S. at 398-99
(unconstitutional to exclude evidence of defendant's family background and capacity for rehabili-
tation); Skipper, 476 U.S. at 8-9 (unconstitutional to exclude evidence of defendant's good
behavior while incarcerated after arrest); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 113 (unconstitutional to exclude
evidence of defendant's emotional disturbance and troubled family background); Lockett, 438
U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion) (unconstitutional to exclude evidence of defendant's age, minor
role in offense, and absence of intent to cause death). Compare Brogdon v. Butler, 824 F.2d 338,
343 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (refusal to admit evidence that coindictee received life sentence not
unconstitutional because irrelevant to consideration of defendant's character, record, or offense),
cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1040 (1987); Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (10th Cir.)
(refusal to admit testimony of victim's sister that she did not wish jury to impose death penalty
not unconstitutional because not relevant mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 445 (1991)
and Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 935-37 (11th Cir. 1985) (refusal to admit testimony on
deterrent effect of capital punishment on mentally ill not unconstitutional because designed to
persuade sentencer that legislature erred in enacting statute, not to focus on unique characteris-
tics of particular defendant or crime), modified en banc on other grounds, 781 F.2d 185, and cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986) with Chaney v. Brown, 730 F.2d 1334, 1351-57 (10th Cir.) (govern-
ment withholding of FBI reports unconstitutional because evidence mitigating in nature), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1090 (1984).
The Lockett requirement will often conflict with a state's rules of evidence. In Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979) (per curiam), the Supreme Court intimated that an otherwise valid
state evidentiary rule cannot be employed to restrict admission of reliable mitigating evidence. Id.
at 97. The Court held that exclusion of highly relevant testimony under Georgia's hearsay rule
violated the Due Process Clause by denying the defendant a fair trial on the issue of punishment.
Id. Compare Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 622-24 (9th Cir. 1992) (circumstantial evidence
implying that codefendant and third party were responsible for planning crime rather than
defendant relevant and admissible as mitigating evidence even though it did not meet state
evidentiary standard of relevance), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1363 (1993) and Dutton v. Brown, 812
F.2d 593, 599-602 (10th Cir.) (en banc) (unconstitutional to exclude important mitigating testi-
mony by defendant's mother at sentencing hearing merely because she violated sequestration
order when less restrictive alternative existed such as instructing jury that she had heard
witnesses' testimony), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 836 (1987) with Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204,
211-12 (5th Cir. 1988) (statements by defendant to mother that he was sorry for participation in
murder and that, if spared, he would serve God and statement to priest about type of prison work
he wanted to do if spared properly excluded under Mississippi's hearsay rule because not
"unnecessarily limiting" and did not render trial "fundamentally unfair;" Green redresses "egre-
gious evidentiary errors"), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1059 (1989).
2324. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
2325. Id. at 113. In Eddings, the Court found no distinction under Lockett between a statutory
provision precluding a judge or jury from considering mitigating evidence and a trial judge's
refusal to do so: "Just as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering
any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any
relevant mitigating evidence." Id. at 113-14.
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the jury has applied a challenged instruction in a way that prevents the
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence." 26
States may establish requirements for proving mitigating evidence as long as
the burden does not prevent consideration of relevant evidence." 7 For ex-
ample, the Supreme Court invalidated a statute that required a jury to unani-
mously find the existence of a mitigating factor before giving it effect. 28 The
2326. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990). The Boyde Court stated that although a
mere "possibility" of improper application would be insufficient to establish a constitutional
violation, a defendant "need not establish that the jury was more likely than not to have been
impermissibly inhibited by the instruction . .. ." Id. In Boyde, the trial court had instructed the
jury to consider "[any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime" and defined
extenuate to mean "to lessen the seriousness of a crime as by giving an excuse." Id. at 381. The
Supreme Cohrt found that the instruction was clear on its face given society's long held view that
"any other circumstance" that might excuse the crime "certainly includes a defendant's back-
ground and character." Id. at 382. Even if the instruction was facially unclear, the Court reasoned
that a reasonable jury would understand it to permit the consideration of background and
character evidence given the "introduction without objection of volumes of mitigating evidence."
Id. at 384.
The Eighth Circuit applied Boyde's "reasonable likelihood" standard in holding that the failure
to instruct a jury of the capital defendant's youth as a statutory mitigating factor did not
impermissibly influence the sentencing determination. Bolder v. Arnontrout, 921 F.2d 1359, 1366
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 154 (1991); cf. Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092, 1103, 1105
(4th Cir. 1990) (lack of any jury instruction as to mitigating factors under Virginia capital
punishment scheme permissible), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1123 (1991).
2327. See Saffie v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990) ("There is a simple and logical difference
between rules that govern what factors a jury must be permitted to consider in making its
sentencing decision, and rules that govern how the State may guide the jury in considering and
weighing those factors in reaching a decision."); see also Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099,
1109 (9th Cir. 1992) (jury not constrained from considering all mitigating evidence of emotional
disturbance by instruction explicitly requesting them to consider only "extreme" emotional
disturbance).
Under certain circumstances, the Court has found that the state has an affirmative duty to
assist the defendant in obtaining or preparing certain types of mitigating evidence. For instance,
sometimes the trial court must appoint a psychiatrist to assist the defendant in the preparation of
mitigating evidence. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985) (defendants must be given
access to competent psychiatrist at trial or sentencing if mental state in issue); Smith v.
McCormick, 914 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1990) (due process violated when court-appointed
psychiatrist, who reported only to court, did not assist defendant in preparing claims regarding
mitigating circumstances during sentencing phase of capital trial).
2328. McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 444 (1990); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 384
(1988) (death sentence vacated when ambiguous jury instruction could reasonably be construed
to require jury unanimity in finding mitigating factors). Compare Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919
F.2d 1091, 1109-10 (6th Cir. 1990) (sentence vacated when substantial possibility that jury misled
by lack of instruction regarding mitigating factors, given unanimity requirement as to aggravating
factors, "common perception" that jury findings should be unanimous, and showing that jury
"struggled" with mitigating evidence), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1608 (1991) and Kubat v. Thieret,
867 F.2d 351, 373 (7th Cir.) (sentence vacated when substantial possibility that reasonable jury
could interpret instruction to require jury unanimity in finding sufficiency of mitigating circum-
stances), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874 f1989) with Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 679 (4th Cir. 1993)
(no substantial possibility jury misled into believing unanimity required when judge failed
explicitly to instruct jury that findings of mitigating factors need not be unanimous because no
substantial possibility that jury misled into thinking unanimity required), rev'd en banc on other
grounds, 14 F.3d 956 (1994); James v. Whitley, 926 F.2d 1433, 1448-49 (5th Cir. 1991) (no
substantial possibility jury misled into believing unanimity required when instructions stated need
to "find" aggravating circumstances, but only to "consider" mitigating circumstances) and Gacy
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Court reasoned that allowing one "holdout juror" to prevent the other eleven
from considering mitigating evidence would violate the constitutional require-
ment that all such evidence be considered in capital cases. 2329 In Walton v.
Arizona,23 30 however, the Court refused to invalidate a statute that required
the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the
evidence.233 In Delo v. Lashley,2 332 the Court held that state courts are not
constitutionally required to give mitigating circumstance instructions when the
defendant has offered no evidence at trial to support them.333
A sentencing scheme must also permit the sentencer to give effect to any
and all mitigating evidence. In Penry v. Lynaugh,2334 the Court vacated a death
sentence when the jury was not instructed that it could give effect to all
mitigating circumstances, including nonstatutory evidence, by declining to
impose the death penalty.23 35 The Court found that the trial court's failure'to
instruct had deprived the jury of a "vehicle for expressing its 'reasoned moral
response' " to mitigating evidence of the defendant's mental retardation and
childhood abuse.1 36 The possible reach of Penry has been circumscribed by
v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 307-08 (7th Cir.) (no substantial possibility jury misled into believing
unanimity required when judge failed to explain statutory provision that death penalty could not
be imposed if even one juror found mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating circum-
stances), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 269 (1993).
2329. McKoy, 494 U.S. at 439-43.
2330. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
2331. Id. at 651 (plurality opinion); id. at.674 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & concurring in
judgment). In Walton, a plurality of four Justices found nothing in Lockett that precluded states
from specifying how mitigating circumstances are to be proved. Id. at 649 (plurality opinion). The
plurality also held that such an allocation of the burden of proof is constitutionally permissible
provided it does not lessen the prosecution's burden to prove either all the elements of the
capital offense or the existence of aggravating circumstances. Id. at 650.
The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that Lockett violations constitute harmless error when a
defendant has failed to produce evidence of any nonstatutory mitigating factors. Clark v. Dugger,
834 F.2d 1561, 1568-70 (11th Cir. 1987), cen. denied, 485 U.S. 982 (1988).
2332. 113 S. Ct. 1222 (1993) (per curiam).
2333. Id. at 1225. In Lashley, the defendant requested that the jury be instructed that he "had
no significant history of prior criminal activity." Id. at 1223. The judge refused to give the
instruction because the defendant introduced no evidence at trial regarding his criminal history.
Id.
2334. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
2335. Id. at 328. Under the Texas sentencing scheme as applied in Penry, the jury returned a
verdict in the form of responses to three "special issues" framed by the judge to determine (1)
whether the defendant's conduct was deliberate, (2) whether the defendant had potential for
future dangerousness, and (3) whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable in response to
any provocation by the victim. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981). If the
jury unanimously answered "yes" to each question, the trial court was required to sentence the
defendant to death. Id. at art. 37.071(e). If the answer to any of the questions was in the negative,
the death penalty could not be imposed, and the defendant received a life sentence. Id. In Penry,
the trial court's instructions allowed the jury to give effect to mitigating circumstances only in
relation to the "special issues" in the Texas capital sentencing statute. Penry, 492 U.S. at 320. The
majority reasoned that mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse had
relevance to moral culpability beyond the scope of the statute, and thus a special jury instruction
was necessary to permit the sentencer to give effect to all mitigating evidence. Id. at 322-26.
2336. Penry, 492 U.S. at 328. The Third Circuit has held that Penry is satisfied by the trial
judge's instructions to consider the circumstances of the offense and the character and record of
1212 [Vol. 82:1153
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Graham v. Collins2 37 and Johnson v. Texas..23 8 In both cases, 239 the Court
concluded that the lack of an explicit instruction to consider mitigating evi-
dence about the defendants' age did not prevent the jury from fully consider-
ing the mitigating effect of the defendants' youth.Y"
When considering mitigating circumstances that might justify a sentence less
than death, the sentencer may not exercise unfettered discretion. In California
v. Brown,' 41 the Court upheld a trial court's antisympathy instruction that
warned the jury not to be swayed by "mere sympathy" in determining whether
to impose a death sentence. 42 The Court concluded that a reasonable juror
would interpret the instruction to mean she should "ignore emotional re-
sponses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence."'
' 43
the defendant. Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 292-93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
280 (1991).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that the judge must instruct an advisory jury to consider both
statutory and nonstatutory mitigating evidence when substantial nonstatutory evidence exists.
Jackson v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 712, 717 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 452 (1991). Moreover,
failure to instruct the jury regarding nonstatutory mitigating evidence is not corrected by the trial
judge's consideration of the evidence in reaching a final determination. Jones v. Dugger, 867 F.2d
1277, 1280 (11th Cir. 1989).
2337. 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
2338. 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
2339. The Court addressed this issue twice because Graham came to the Supreme Court on
collateral review, and while it considered the question of mitigating evidence about the defendant's
age, its disposition of the case rested on its inability to announce a new rule under Teague v.
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 903. Johnson, however, presented the issue
squarely on direct review, and the Court reiterated the substantive position it took in Graham.
Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2668.
2340. In both cases, the Court distinguished the circumstance of mental retardation, present in
Penry, from the circumstance of youth, present in Graham and Johnson. The Graham Court
described the introduction of evidence about mental retardation as a "two-edged sword: it may
diminish his blameworthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability that he
.will be dangerous in the future." Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 901 (quoting Penry, 492 U.S. at 324). On
the other hand, the Court found that the defendant's youth did not have similarly contradictory
significance, and therefore could be given full mitigating effect by the jury without a special
instruction. Id.;Johnson, 113 S. Ct. at 2670.
Since Graham and Johnson were decided, the Fifth Circuit has applied their reasoning to
uphold death sentences imposed under Texas's statutory special issues framework involving a
broad range of mitigating evidence. See Harris v. Collins, 990 F.2d 185, 188-89 (5th Cir.) (special
issues framework allowed jury to give full mitigating effect to possibility that defendant played
only minor role in crime), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3069 (1993); James v. Collins, 987 F.2d 1116,
1121 (5th Cir.) (special issues framework allowed jury to contemplate full mitigating effect of
.defendant's alcohol abuse), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 30 (1993); Jernigan v. Collins, 980 F.2d 292,
295 (5th Cir. 1992) (special issues framework allowed jury to fully consider mitigating evidence
that defendant was "kind and gentle"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1977 (1993). Cutting closest to
what remains of Penry is Demouchette v. Collins, 972 F.2d 651 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 27
(1992), in which the Fifth Circuit held that the language of the first special issue allowed the jury
to adequately consider the mitigating effect of the defendant's antisocial personality disorder
'without further instruction. Id. at 653-54.
2341. 479 U.S. 538 (1987).
2342. Id. at 542. The jury in Brown had been instructed not to be swayed by "mere sentiment,
conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling." Id.
2343. Id. The Court concluded that it was constitutional to "prohibit[] juries from basing their
sentencing decisions on factors not presented at trial." Id. at 542-43; see Coleman v. Saffle, 869
1994] 1213
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When a sentencer determines that no mitigating evidence exists, the state
may require the imposition of the death penalty upon a finding of at least one
statutory aggravating circumstance. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 23 " the Court
rejected a claim that such a statute violated the Eighth Amendment and
instead found that a defendant's right to individualized sentencing was fully
protected by the jury's ability to consider mitigating circumstances. 23 ' Further-
more, the Court concluded that a statute may constitutionally require a jury to
impose the death penalty after making "certain findings against the defendant
beyond the initial conviction for murder." ' 46 In Boyde v. California, 47 the
Court upheld a statute mandating the imposition of the death penalty when
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.2348
Improper Influences in Capital Cases. A death sentence may be reversed on
grounds that the jury imposing the sentence was influenced or misled by
improper evidence, arguments, or instructions. In Dawson v. Delaware,2 49 the
Supreme Court invalidated a death sentence when the penalty phase included
a stipulation that the defendant belonged to a "white racist prison gang.
' 2350
F.2d 1377, 1391-92 (10th Cir. 1989) (sentencing phase antisympathy instruction did not create
possibility that jury rested sentence on improper ground when no relevant mitigating evidence
admitted), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Lusk v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 946, 951 (11th Cir.)
(judge's instruction that "mercy" should not be considered upheld because reasonable juror
would understand instruction to mean not to consider irrelevant factors as mitigating circum-
stances), withdrawn in part, 976 F.2d 631 (1992) (per curiam) (instruction not to consider "mercy"
must still allow consideration of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances).
In Parks, the Court held that a possible negative inference from Brown's requirement that a
sentencer be free to give effect to "mere sympathy" actually rooted in mitigating evidence was a
new rule under Teague that could not be announced on collateral review. 494 U.S. at 488-89. The
Court concluded that its prior holdings preventing limits on what mitigating evidence juries may
consider did not dictate any result when the challenge pertained to how the mitigating evidence
may be considered. Id. at 490. Although the lower court had concluded that Brown "implicitly
suggested that sympathy that is based on the evidence is a valid consideration in sentencing,"
Parks v. Brown, 860 F.2d 1545, 1553 (10th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), the Supreme
Court expressed doubt that such an inference followed from Brown or was consistent with
precedent. Parks, 494 U.S. at 493-94.
Upon remand, in Parks v. Safflie, 925 F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir. 1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 213 (1991), the Tenth Circuit applied the Boyde "reasonable likelihood" standard and held
that the antisympathy instruction did not impermissibly curtail the jury's consideration of
relevant mitigating evidence.
2344. 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
2345. Id. at 306-07. The defendant contended that a jury must also be allowed to consider the
relative severity of the aggravating circumstances in order to provide the constitutionally required
individualized sentencing. Id. at 306.
2346. Id. at 303.
2347. 494 U.S. 370 (1990).
2348. Id. at 377. The Court concluded that a state need not provide the jury with "unfettered
sentencing discretion" and that the state is "free to structure and shape consideration of
mitigating evidence . . ." Id.; see Singleton v. Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315, 1323 (8th Cir.) (state death
penalty statute not unconstitutional even though mandates imposition of death penalty if proven
aggravating circumstances outweigh proven mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 435
(1992).
2349. 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992).
2350. Id. at 1096.
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The Court held that evidence of the gang activity was irrelevant because it
"proved nothing more than [the defendant's] abstract beliefs." 5'3  The Court
refused, however, to create a per se barrier against the introduction of evi-
dence concerning membership in an association. 2 52
In Payne v. Tennessee,21 53 the Supreme Court overruled two prior deci-
sions235 and held that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit admission of
"victim impact" evidence and related prosecutorial argument 2355 at the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital trial. 356 The Court held that evidence and argument
2351. Id. at 1098.
2352. Id. at 1097-98. A defendant's race, religion, sexual preference or membership in an
association may be properly considered by a court only if it is relevant to show motive. Compare
Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 948-49 (1983) (plurality opinion) (upholding death sentence
when sentencing judge considered defendant's racial motive because defendant's desire to start a
racial war could be relevant to "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" statutory aggravating
circumstance) and Brecht v. Abrahamson, 944 F.2d 1363, 1365 (7th Cir. 1991) (upholding death
sentence when evidence of defendant's homosexuality relevant to show motive of retaliation
against victim's animosity towards defendant's sexual preference), afrd on other grounds, 113 S.
Ct. 1710 (1993) with Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 865 (1983) (holding "factors that are
constitutionally impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process [include] ... for
example the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant .... ") and Beam v. Paskett, 3
F.3d 1301, 1310 (9th Cir. 1993) (overturning death sentence when judge considered defendant's
history of sexual assault by parents, homosexuality, and relationships with both younger and older
women because evidence not linked to statutory aggravating circumstances of future dangerous-
ness).
2353. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
2354. Id. at 2611. Payne overruled Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 507 (1987) (victim impact
evidence inadmissible at sentencing phase of capital trial unless directly related to circumstances
of crime) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 811 (1989) (Booth rule extended to
prohibit prosecutor's statements regarding personal characteristics of victim).
2355. Misconduct or improper remarks by defense counsel more appropriately fall under
ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851, 855 n.4 (11th Cir.
1989) (claim that defense attorney's comments misled jury properly brought under Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel rather than under Eighth Amendment right to reasoned sentencing
determination), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962 (1990). Ineffectiveness of counsel is discussed in greater
detail in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in RIGHT TO COUNSEL in Part III.
2356. In Payne, the trial court admitted the testimony of a grandmother describing a three-year-
old's suffering due to the killing of his mother and two-year-old sister. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at
2603-04; see also Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 105 (5th Cir. 1992) (testimony of victim's wife
regarding victim's character and reputation in community admissible); Williams v. Chrans, 945
F.2d 926, 946-47 (7th Cir. 1991) (report describing victim as nurse, mother, and wife admissible),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992). The trial court also allowed the prosecutor's closing argument
regarding the continuing effect of the deaths on the victims' family. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2603-04;
see also Horton v. Zant, 941 F.2d 1449, 1465-66 (11th Cir. 1991) (prosecutor's repeated refer-
ences to victim's occupation as District Attorney admissible), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1516 (1992).
The Court's previous decisions.in Booth, 482 U.S. at 496, and Gathers, 490 U.S. at 805, had
prohibited the admission of three categories of evidence: (1) the victim's personal characteristics;
(2) the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family; and (3) the victim's family members'
characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence.
Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2; id. at 2614 n.1 (Souter & Kennedy, JJ., concurring). In Payne, the
Court overruled Booth and Gathers to permit the admission of the first and second categories of
evidence. Id. at 2611 n.2 (majority opinion). The Payne Court did not address the third category
of evidence excluded under Booth. Id. at 2611 n.2; id. at 2614 n.1 (Souter & Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring) ("This case presents no challenge to the Court's holding in Booth v. Maryland that a
sentencing authority should not receive a third category of information concerning a victim's
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relating to the victim's personal characteristics and the impact of the victim's
death on the victim's family are legitimate means of informing the sentencer
about the specific harm caused by the defendant's acts." s7 The Court sug-
gested that when admission of such evidence is unfairly prejudicial, the defen-
dant may obtain relief under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.
2358
family members' characterization of and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the
appropriate sentence."); see Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir. 1991) (Payne did
not remove barrier to admission of opinion testimony offered by victim's sister that she did not
wish death penalty to be imposed upon defendant), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1285 (1992).
2357. Payne, II1 S. Ct. at 2608.
2358. Id. (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986)). Improper comments by
the prosecutor have required reversal when they "so infected the trial with unfairness as to make
the resulting conviction a denial of due process." Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (quoting Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)). In Darden, the Court found no denial of due process
even though the prosecutor referred to the defendant as an "animal" and on multiple occasions
expressed his belief that someone should have "blown [the defendant's] head off." Id. at 182-83.
The majority emphasized that the comments were an "invited response" to defense counsel's
arguments. Id. at 182. Moreover, the remarks did not manipulate or misstate evidence, nor
implicate other specific rights of the defendant. Id.
Analyzing the totality of the circumstances, circuit courts generally have rejected due process
challenges to prosecutorial comments that allegedly influenced the sentencing determination.
Compare Lawson v. Dixon, 3 F.3d 743, 755 (4th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's comments that victim's
house was his "crucifixion block," that defendant's constitutional rights should be compared to
those of victim, and that other countries summarily hung convicted first-degree murderers not
due process violation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1208 (1994); Drew v. Collins, 964 F.2d 411, 417-19
(5th Cir. 1992) (prosecutor's comments that defendant was "sadistic killer" and that jury should
return swift verdict to avoid insulting victim's family not due prezess violation), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 3044 (1993); Resnover v. Pearson, 965 F.2d 1453, 1465 (7th Cir. 1992) (prosecutor's
comment that defendant not present at penalty phase not due process violation because comment
only indicated factual situation and did not implicate defendant's self-incrimination right), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 2935 (1993); Pickens v. Lockhart, 4 F.3d 1446, 1453 (8th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's
comments regarding race of victims improper but not due process violation), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1206 (1994); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d 1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's comment
concerning state law procedure allowing defendant to make statement during closing argument
without cross-examination not due process violation because comment rebutted defendant's
claim of innocence), petition for cert. filed. 62 U.S.L.W. 3505 (U.S. Dec. 20, 1993) (No. 93-971)
and Bush v. Singletary, 988 F.2d 1082, 1088 (11th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's isolated comment
suggesting defendant was triggerman, although inconsistent with prosecutor's overall presenta-
tion and argument and unnecessary to sustain first-degree murder conviction, not due process
violation), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 705 (1994) with Lesko v. Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1541, 1545-46
(3d Cir.) (prosecutor's appeal to jurors to take vengeance on defendant violated due process),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 273 (1991); Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1989)
(prosecutor's statements expressing personal beliefs about death penalty, comparing defendant
to other mass murderers, and insinuating that all murderers should be executed "totally infected
the proceedings" with unfairness and violated due process), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1038 (1990) and
Nelson v. Nagle, 995 F.2d 1549, 1555-57 (11th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's reading of anachronistic
Georgia Supreme Court case to jury violated due process because improperly suggested that jury
could not consider mercy even though mercy implicitly a proper mitigating consideration).
Comments regarding penological justifications for imposition of the death penalty have been
held proper for closing argument. See King v. Puckett, 1 F.3d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's
argument that death penalty serves as deterrent permissible); Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926,
949-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (prosecutor's comments that death sentence appropriate to show that
defendant's behavior should not be tolerated held permissible), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3002
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If jurors are potentially misled concerning their roles in sentencing, the
"Eighth Amendment's heightened need for reliability '23 59 may require rever-
sal. In Caldwell v. Mississippi,"' the prosecutor suggested that the jury's
decision to impose the death penalty would not be final because it would be
reviewed for correctness by an appellate court.236' In vacating the sentence,
the Court found it "constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on
a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death
rests elsewhere. ' 3 62 When a defendant claims that improper jury instructions
(1992); U.S. v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1095 (11th Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's comment that
recommending death penalty serves as "form of self-defense for society" permissible because
prosecutor may argue that death penalty serves as deterrent), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W.
3454 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1993) (No. 93-1033).
The propriety of the introduction of emotionally inflammatory evidence is evaluated by
determining whether due process was denied. See Hatley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070, 1072 (8th
Cir. 1993) (due process not violated by introduction of photographs of murder victims, although
neither identity nor cause of death contested, because photos routine autopsy views and used to
assist medical examiner during testimony).
2359. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 340 (1985) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
2360. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
2361. Id. at 323.
2362. Id. at 328-29. The Court expressed concern that such prosecutorial comments might
encourage a jury to impose an unwarranted death sentence to "send a message" of extreme
disapproval of the defendant's acts. Id. at 331. The majority also asserted that such comments
would produce juror bias because a jury seeking to minimize its role in sentencing might impose
the death penalty based on the assumption that the death sentence would be reviewed, whereas a
life sentence would be unreviewable. Id. at 331-33.
To support a Caldwell claim, the criminal defendant must show that the improper comments
misled the jury. See Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.) (no Caldwell violation when
prosecutor emphasized that role of jury not to decide punishment, but to apply and answer
statutory questions because comments did not misstate law, but rather encouraged jury to avoid
decision based upon emotional appeal), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 959 (1992); Gilmore v. Armon-
trout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1066 (8th Cir. 1988) (no Caldwell violation when prosecutor's closing
comments raised possibility of defendant's parole because statements "accurately apprised" jury
of sentencing alternatives), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114 (1989); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d
1099, 1108 (9th Cir. 1992) (no Caldwell violation when prosecutor's statement attempting to
alleviate responsibility for passage of death penalty law from minds of jury accurately stated law);
U.S. v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1095 (11th Cir. 1993) (no Caldwell violation when prosecutor
told jury that recommending death sentence would be defendant killing himself by his actions and
that death penalty imposed by judicial process because comment emphasized jury's responsibility
to evaluate evidence and determine if actions merited death sentence), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1993) (No. 93-1033).
The Fifth Circuit has cautioned that statements describing the jury's role in the imposition of
the death penalty can be literally true but misleading. See Sawyer v. Butler, 881 F.2d 1273, 1285
(5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (statements failing to disclose all material information can be mislead-
ing and therefore Caldwell violation), aff'd on other grounds, 497 U.S. 227 (1990). The Eighth and
Ninth Circuits have allowed prosecutorial remarks about appellate review of mistakes by the
judge or counsel, provided that no reference is made either to the jury's role in sentencing or to
appellate review of their decision. Guinan v. Armontrout, 909 F.2d 1224, 1233 (8th Cir. 1990)
(jury not misled because even unsophisticated layperson aware of appellate courts and function
of correcting trial court mistakes), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1074 (1991); Jeffries v. Blodgett, 5 F.3d
1180, 1192 (9th Cir. 1993) (jury not misled because jurors know case can be appealed and jury in
this case properly instructed regarding responsibility), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3505
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resulted in a Caldwell violation, she "must show that the remarks to the jury
improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law."' 63
In California v. Ramos,2364 the Court rejected an argument that the jury was
misled when an instruction informed them of the governor's power to com-
mute a life sentence without parole, but not of his power to commute a death
(U.S. Dec. 20, 1993) (No. 93-971). The Eleventh Circuit has permitted prosecutorial references
to the advisory nature of the jury as long as the remarks do not diminish the jury's sense of
responsibility. Compare Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464, 1473-75 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Caldwell not violated by prosecutor's repeated statements that jury's decision merely recommen-
dation and that court bore final sentencing responsibility because comments did not imply that
jury's role superfluous), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989) with Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446,
1457-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Caldwell violated by prosecutor's repeated comments that
jury's role advisory and that final responsibility for sentencing rested with court when judge did
not emphasize jury's role), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
To evaluate the effect of the challenged statements, circuit courts consider the entire trial
record. See Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167, 173 (5th Cir.) (court should not consider prosecutor's
argument in isolation, but in context of general purpose of argument), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 959
(1992); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1295-96 (10th Cir. 1989) (court must consider
whether prosecutor's statements, taken in context, would have altered sentencing decision), cert.
denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990); Bush v. Singletary, 988 F.2d 1082, 1089 (11th Cir. 1993) (court
considered instructions given by trial judge, not just the prosecutor's comment that majority vote
of seven needed for any recommendation; trial judge clearly explained that six or more votes
adequate for recommendation of no death penalty), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 705 (1994). Curative
instructions by the trial judge can correct misleading statements by the prosecutor. See McCorquo-
dale v. Kemp, 829 F.2d 1035, 1037 (11th Cir.) (per curiam) (court's strong criticism of prosecuto-
rial emphasis of appellate court's role in reviewing jury's sentencing determination corrected
mistaken jury impression and avoided Caldwell violation), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1055 (1987).
However, the Eleventh Circuit has held that an advisory jury recommendation tainted by a
Caldwell violation cannot be cleansed by the trial court's error-free sentencing determination. See
Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1454 (11th Cir. 1988) (Caldwell violation triggered when advisory
sentencing jury misled as to role, and otherwise error-free final sentencing by court cannot cure
constitutional error), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989). The Fifth Circuit has permitted allegedly
improper Caldwell remarks when such remarks rebut defense counsel arguments. See Smith v.
Black, 904 F.2d 950, 980 (5th Cir. 1990) (prosecutor's repeated reference to possibility of
defendant's parole not Caldwell violation when issue introduced by defense counsel), vacated on
other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1463 (1992).
The three circuit courts reaching the issue have applied different standards to determine
whether Caldwell-violative statements require vacation of a sentence. See Sawyer v. Butler, 881
F.2d 1273, 1284-85 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (sentence must be vacated unless statements had
"no effect" upon jury), aff'd on other grounds, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888
F.2d 1286, 1295 (10th Cir. 1989) (sentence must be vacated when "substantial possibility" that
prosecutor's statements affected sentencing decision), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1010 (1990); Tucker
v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295-96 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (per curiam) (sentence must be
vacated when "reasonable probability" that, but for Caldwell error, outcome would be different),
cert. denied, 480 U.S. 911 (1987). The Eighth Circuit used the "reasonable probability" standard
when considering a prosecutorial misconduct challenge to which Caldwell did not apply for
procedural reasons. Newlon v. Armontrout, 885 F.2d 1328, 1336-37 (8th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
497 U.S. 1038 (1990).
In Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), the Supreme Court held that Caldwell announced a
'new rule" and therefore defendants whose convictions became final prior to the decision in
Caldwell are not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief based on a Caldwell error. Id. at 241. For
a discussion of the retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure, see
Cognizable Issues in HABEAS RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS in Part V.
2363. Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 407 (1989).
2364. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
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sentence. 6 The Court held that the jury's appreciation of the gravity of its
role was not affected because the instruction was accurate'
66 and relevant 67
to a legitimate state interest.
2368
Generally, a judge is not obliged to instruct juries that the defendant may be
convicted of a lesser included offense in lieu of the capital offense. 6 9 Such an
instruction must be given only "if the evidence would permit a jury rationally
to find a defendant guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the [capital
offense]."' Nevertheless, in Schad v. Arizona,'37' the Court held that a
2365. Id. at 1013.
2366. Id. at 1004 n.19, 1009. In light of the sentencing alternatives, the death penalty or a life
sentence without parole, the Court found that the actual jury instruction supplied accurate
information *to correct any possible misimpression that a defendant sentenced to life without
parole could not have her sentence commuted by the governor to include the possibility of parole.
Id. at 1004 n.19.
2367. Id. at 1005-09. The Court dismissed the claim that the instruction was speculative and
determined that its essential effect was to invite the jury to assess the aggravating factor of future
dangerousness. Id. at 1003, 1008.
2368. See id. at 1004 n.19 (state has interest in accurately characterizing sentencing choices).
The Court also noted that an instruction disclosing the governor's power to commute a death
sentence could operate to the defendant's disadvantage because the jury's appreciation of the
gravity of its sentencing decision might be diminished. Id. at 1011.
The Fourth Circuit has held that states may decide what, if anything, the jury should be told
about commutation, pardon, and parole. Peterson v. Murray, 904 F.2d 882, 886-87 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 992 (1990). The Fifth Circuit has held that the judge is not required to instruct a
jury that it could return a life sentence even when it found aggravating, but no mitigating,
circumstances. Hill v. Black, 887 F.2d 513, 520 (5th Cir. 1989), vacated, 498 U.S. 801, and
reinstated, 920 F.2d 249 (5th Cir. 1990).
2369. Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982). But see Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,
642-43 (1980) (invalidating state statute prohibiting lesser included offense instructions in capital
cases). In Beck, the Court was concerned that the Alabama statute forced the jury to decide
between acquittal and conviction for the capital offense. Id. While a capital conviction might be
unwarranted, if jurors believed that the defendant committed some crime, they might still convict
the defendant of the capital offense simply to ensure that some punishment was imposed. Id.
2370. Hopper, 456 U.S. at 612 (citing Keeble v. U.S., 412 U.S. 205, 208 (1973)). Compare Cantu
v. Collins, 967 F.2d 1006, 1014 (5th Cir. 1992) (court has no duty to offer instruction on lesser
included offense of noncapital murder when defendant offered only "unsupported conjecture" to
satisfy elements of lesser offense), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3045 (1993); Kubat v. Thieret, 867 F.2d
351, 365-66 (7th Cir.) (court has no duty, sua sponte, to offer instruction on lesser included
offense of unlawful restraint when defendant, charged with murder and kidnapping, may have
made strategic decision not to request unlawful restraint instruction), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874
(1989); Williams v. Armontrout, 912 F.2d 924, 930 (8th Cir. 1990) (court has no duty to offer
instruction on lesser included offense of kidnapping when abduction part of capital offense), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1127 (1991) and U.S. vi Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1099 (11th Cir. 1993) (court
has no duty, sua sponte, to offer instruction on lesser offense of murder-for-hire when defendant,
charged with murder while engaged in and in furtherance of continuing criminal enterprise, may
have made strategic decision not to request murder-for-hire instruction), petition for cert. filed, 62
U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1993) (No. 93-1033) with Wiggerfall v. Jones, 918 F.2d 1544, 1550
(11th Cir. 1990) (court must offer instruction on lesser included noncapital offense of felony
murder when evidence would support finding of guilt as to noncapital offense and acquittal as to
capital offense).
The Supreme Court has held that a defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed about a
lesser included offense for which the statute of limitations has expired, unless she chooses to
waive her statute of limitations defense. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1984).
2371. 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991).
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defendant is not entitled to an instruction on every lesser included offense
supported by the evidence as long as the jury has been provided with a "third
option" to acquittal or capital conviction. 72
Although the Court has sought to direct and limit the discretion of capital
sentencing bodies, the Court has stated that "the requirement of heightened
rationality in the imposition of capital punishment does not 'plac[e] totally
unrealistic conditions on its use.' ,2373 In McCleskey v. Kemp,2374 the Court
held that statistical evidence of racial discrepancies in capital sentencing does
not demonstrate arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory application of the
death penalty without a showing that purposeful discrimination produced an
unfair sentence in a particular case. 75 The Court concluded that once the
method for imposing the death penalty was surrounded with sufficient proce-
dural safeguards, any discretion exercised by the jury was constitutionally
permissible. 76
Death Qualification. As with any criminal penalty, a death sentence may be
reversed if the jury fails to meet the due process requirements of fairness and
impartiality.2377 In Wainwright v. Witt,2371 the Court held that potential jurors
2372. Id. at 2504-05. In Schad, the defendant was indicted for first-degree capital murder. Id.
at 2495. The trial court refused the defendant's request for a jury instruction on robbery as a
lesser included offense, but did instruct the jury on second-degree, noncapital murder. Id. The
Supreme Court reasoned that the instruction on second-degree murder, as a "third option" to
acquittal or capital conviction, was sufficient to ensure the reliability of the jury's capital murder
verdict. Id. at 2505; see Terry v. Petsock, 974 F.2d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 1992) (court not required to
give instruction on lesser included homicide offense when jury knew that defendant, life prisoner,
would return to prison even if acquitted; jury also given Schad third option through instructions
on lesser included nonhomicide offense), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1338 (1993).
2373. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 n.37 (1987) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 199 n.50 (1976) (plurality opinion)). In McClesky, the majority objected to the dissent's call
for "a uniquely high degree of rationality in imposing the death penalty," id. at 335 (Brennan,
Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., dissenting), arguing that the "unprecedented safeguards"
inherent in current capital sentencing statutes "ensure a degree of care in the imposition of the
sentence of death that can be described only as unique." Id. at 313 n.37 (majority opinion).
2374. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
2375. Id. at 292-93. In McCleskey, the Court reasoned that when the state legislature has
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for enacting its capital punishment statute, when there is no
evidence that the legislature maintained the statute because of its racially disproportionate
impact, and when the capital sentencing system is able to operate in a fair and neutral manner,
there is no inference of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 298.
2376. Id. at 313. Although noting that the statistics demonstrated a risk that racial bias
affected Georgia's capital sentencing process, the Court concluded that any such risk was not
"constitutionally significant." Id.; see King v. Puckett, 1 F.3d 280, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1993)
(defendant's statistical evidence that African-American males accused of killing white victims
more likely to receive death penalty, prosecutor's remarks about "black minister" during closing
argument, and prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove African-American jurors
from venire fall short of demonstrating purposeful racial discrimination).
2377. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). In Witherspoon, the trial judge
summarily excused for cause 47 venire members-about half the total-who expressed some
misgivings about the death penalty. Id. at 513. The Court held that the jury resulting from this
method was "uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die," and that the method violated the
Due Process Clause and the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 518, 521.
2378. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
1220 [Vol. 82:1153
HeinOnline  -- 82 Geo. L.J. 1220 1993-1994
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROJECT
who are opposed to the death penalty may be excluded for cause because
they might otherwise frustrate a state's legitimate interest in administering its
capital sentencing statute.2379 The Court noted that such views "would pre-
vent or substantially impair the performance of [a juror's] duties... in ac-
cordance with his instructions and his oath."' 80 Similarly, the Court in
2379. Id. at 423. The Court in Witt emphasized that its holding was not "a ground for
challenging any juror. It is rather a limitation on the state's power to exclude ...... Id. (quoting
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1980)). The Court stated that it's holding was merely an
application of the Sixth Amendment's requirement of a fair and impartial trial to a capital
sentencing procedure. Id.
2380. Id. at 420 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45). In establishing this standard, the Court
sought to dispel lower court confusion and to clarify that more stringent Witherspoon language
was not controlling. Id. at 422. Dicta in Witherspoon had limited exclusion for cause to those
extreme venirepersons who made it "unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote
against capital punishment... or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent
them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at
522-23 n.21.
The Witt majority asserted that the "prevent or substantially impair" standard is better suited
to the current duties of capital sentencing juries. Witt, 469 U.S. at 424. The Witherspoon jury of
the late 1960s was vested with unlimited discretion; thus, a juror who was willing to consider the
death penalty was able to follow the law and abide by her oath. Id. at 421. Since Witherspoon,
however, many states have enacted capital sentencing schemes in which jurors are asked specific
factual questions, the answers to which determine punishment. Id. at 422. In this context, a state
may properly exclude a venireperson who would be unable to answer truthfully questions that
could lead to imposition of the death penalty. Id.
Circuit courts have differed as to when the Witt standard has been satisfied. Compare Lesko v.
Lehman, 925 F.2d 1527, 1548 (3d Cir.) (potential juror properly excluded when answers during
voir dire indicated that personal opposition to death penalty would preclude her from consider-
ing all lawful penalties), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 273 (1991); Nethery v. Collins, 993 F.2d 1154,
1160 (5th Cir. 1993) (potential juror properly excluded when she expressed disapproval of death
penalty and difficulty to cast aside convictions in favor of court's instructions), cert. denied, 1993
WL 495451 (U.S. Apr. 4, 1994) (No. 93-6862); Hatley v. Lockhart, 990 F.2d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir.
1993) (potential juror properly excluded when she repeatedly expressed opposition to death
penalty and remarked that, if defendant found guilty, she would automatically vote for life
without parole) and Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1103 (9th Cir. 1992) (potential jurors
properly excluded when they told court they would automatically vote against death penalty) with
Davis v. Maynard, 869 F.2d 1401, 1408 (10th Cir. 1989) (exclusion proper only when potential
juror could not subordinate conscientious scruples against death penalty to legal duty as juror;
question of whether imposing capital punishment would harm individual's conscience and soul
irrelevant), vacated, 494 U.S. 1050, affd in part and rev'd in part per curiam, 911 F.2d 415 (1990).
The Eleventh Circuit applies the Witt rule even when the jury's role is advisory. See Bundy v.
Dugger, 850 F.2d 1402, 1420-21 (11th Cir. 1988) (force of Witt not diminished by Florida jury's
advisory role), cer. denied, 488 U.S. 1034 (1989).
The trial court's exclusion for cause is a finding of fact bearing a presumption of correctness.
Wil, 469 U.S. at 428-29; see Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 175, 178 (1986) (trial judge
entitled to deference in excluding potential jurors because judge present during voir dire
questioning); Russell v. Collins, 998 F.2d 1287, 1293 (5th Cir. 1993) (trial judge's factual finding
of juror bias entitled to deference when potential juror "did not believe in" death penalty and did
not think he could impose death penalty except possibly if murder victim was small child), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 1236 (1994); Hulsey v. Sargent, 865 F.2d 954, 957-59 (8th Cir.) (trial judge
entitled to deference in excluding potential juror who continually equivocated during voir dire,
even though prosecutor failed to ask if juror could follow law despite personal beliefs), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 923 (1989); Stewart v. Dugger, 877 F.2d 851, 855-52 (11th Cir. 1989) (trial judge
entitled to deference in excluding potential juror when judge found that juror did not believe in
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Morgan v. Illinois,238' held that venire members who would automatically vote
for the death penalty for every eligible defendant must be excluded for
cause.2
3 82
A jury is considered "death qualified" once death penalty-opposed jurors
are excluded." s3 In Lockhart v. McCree, 2 ' the Court rejected the claim that
"death qualified" juries violate the defendant's right to have her guilt or
innocence determined by an impartial jury selected from a cross-section of the
community." s5 The Court held that "an impartial jury consists of nothing
capital punishment "at all," except possibly for Charles Manson), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 962
(1990).
Both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits have expressed unwillingness to require the judge or
defense counsel to attempt to rehabilitate jurors who state their opposition to the death penalty.
See Boggs v. Bair, 892 F.2d 1193, 1201 (4th Cir. 1989) (trial judge not constitutionally required to
"rehabilitate by his personal questioning" jurors who could not put aside personal beliefs), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 940 (1990); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 978-79 (5th Cir. 1990) (defense counsel
not required to rehabilitate disqualifiable jurors when jurors "clearly and unmistakably" stated
that their opposition to death penalty would affect decision about defendant's guilt), vacated on
other grounds, 112 S. Ct. 1463 (1992).
2381. 112 S. Ct. 2222 (1992).
2382. Id. at 2229. The Court reasoned that any prospective juror automatically voting for death
would fail to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, thus'violating
the impartiality requirement of the Due Process Clause. Id. The Court also held that a judge is
required in voir dire to conduct, upon defendant's request, a direct inquiry into the views of the
venire members concerning capital punishment. Id. at 2230.
Although the Court in- Morgan reaffirmed the Witt standard, id. at 2229, it is unclear what
standard lower courts will apply when excluding jurors whose opposition to capital punishment
might make them unfairly partial. See Bunch v. Thompson, 949 F.2d 1354, 1367 (4th Cir. 1991)
(jurors properly seated when, although agreeing that death penalty should be imposed in every
case of murder, "both changed their positions upon immediate requestioning"), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 3056 (1992); Mathenia v. Delo, 975 F.2d 444, 453 (8th Cir. 1992) (juror properly seated
despite statements he would automatically vote for death penalty following capital murder
conviction; venireman also failed to respond when judge asked whether anyone would not follow
instructions on aggravating and mitigating circumstances), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1609 (1993);
U.S. v. Chandler, 996 F.2d 1073, 1103 (11th Cir. 1993) (jurors properly seated when, although
proponents of death penalty, would not automatically vote for death penalty if defendant found
guilty),petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3454 (U.S. Dec. 28, 1993) (No. 93-1033).
2383. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 166-67 (1985).
2384. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
2385. Id. at 173-78. In Lockhart, the Court discounted as unreliable and irrelevant the
defendant's proffered statistical studies which concluded that "death qualified" juries are "more
prone to convict." Id. at 168-73. The Court stated that removal of Witherspoon-excludables would
be constitutional even if it resulted in conviction-prone juries because the fair cross-section
requirement does not apply to petit juries, but only to the general venire. Id. at 173-74. Moreover,
under Lockhart, the Constitution is violated only when a "distinctive group" in the community,
such as blacks or women, is arbitrarily excluded; death qualification serves a valid state interest in
efficient administration of laws, and groups defined solely by shared attitudes are not "distinctive
groups" for Sixth Amendment purposes. Id. at 174-77; cf Brown v. Dixon, 891 F.2d 490, 497 (4th
Cir. 1989) (no Sixth Amendment violation to use peremptory challenges to purge jury of
members, not excludable for cause or under Witherspoon, who expressed reservations about death
penalty), cert. denied, 495 U.S. ?53 (1990); U.S. v. Villareal, 963 F.2d 725, 728-29 (5th Cir.) (no
First or Fifth Amendment violation to use peremptory challenges to exclude all potential jurors
who expressed general opposition to death penalty when political belief not valid basis for claim
against discrimination in jury service), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 353 (1992).
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more than 'jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.' ,,2"86
Stays and Holds. An individual Supreme Court Justice or a majority of the
Court may grant a stay of execution while a prisoner seeks review of a denial
of habeas relief.23 7 A majority of the Court may set aside a stay already
granted by either a lower court 88 or by an individual Justice." 9
An individual Supreme Court Justice may grant an in-chambers stay only in
extraordinary circumstances. 2390 A stay should not be granted by an individual
Justice unless that Justice finds "a reasonable probability that four Members
of the Court would consider the underlying issue sufficiently meritorious for
the grant of certiorari or the notation of probable jurisdiction; ... a significant
possibility of reversal of the lower court's decision; and.., a likelihood that
irreparable harm will result if that decision is not stayed. '2 9 t
2386. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 178 (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 423 (emphasis added in Lockhart)).
The Court dismissed defendant's argument that death qualification "tips the scales," noting that
it would be impractical for the trial judge to balance individual viewpoints on the petit jury. Id.
2387. The power of an individual Justice to grant a stay pending certiorari proceedings is
derived from 28 U.S.C. § 2101(f) (1988), which provides that
[i]n any case in which the final judgment or decree of any court is subject to review by
the Supreme Court on writ of certiorari, the execution and enforcement of such
judgment or decree may be stayed for a reasonable time to enable the party aggrieved to
obtain a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. The stay may be granted by a judge
of the court rendering the judgment or decree or by a justice of the Supreme Court....
Id. (emphasis added); cf. Rostker v. Goldberg, 448 U.S. 1306, 1308 (1980) (Brennan, J., in
chambers) (relief from single Justice appropriate when applicant makes extraordinary showing
that decisions below both on merits and on proper interim disposition are incorrect). For a
detailed discussion of habeas relief, see HABEAS RELIEF FOR STATE PRISONERS and HABEAS RELIEF
FOR FEDERAL PRISONERS in Part V.
2388. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Harris, 112 S. Ct. 1713, 1713-14 (1992). In Harris, the Court vacated
four stays granted by the Ninth Circuit. Id.; see also Gomez v. U.S. Dist. Court, 112 S. C1. 1652,
1653 (1992) (per curiam) (vacating stay granted by the Ninth Circuit). The Harris Court's
unprecedented final order prevented any federal court from entering another stay of Harris's
execution. Harris, 112 S. Ct. at 1713-14; see also Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 322 (1990) (per
curiam) (four federal habeas corpus writs constitute abuse); Woodard v. Hutchins, 464 U.S. 377,
379 (1984) (per curiam) (two writs constitute abuse).
2389. See Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1323 (1973) (Marshall, Circuit Justice)
(issuing stay, under informal agreement of seven other Justices, effectively overruling vacation of
stay issued by Justice Douglas); id. at 1325 n.4 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting, in chambers)
("[Supreme Court] Rules 50 and 51 [now 22 and 23] govern the in-chambers practices of the
Court. Rule 50 [now 221 provides that, when one Justice denies an application made to him, the
party who has made the unsuccessful application may renew it to any other Justice .... But
neither [rule] authorizes a party, once a stay has been granted, to contest that action before
another individual Justice."); Rosenberg v. U.S., 346 U.S. 273, 288 (1953) (per curiam) (vacating
stay granted by Justice Douglas, although conceding single Justice has jurisdiction to enter stay).
2390. Rostker, 448 U.S. at 1308.
2391. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 895-96 (1983) (quoting White v. Florida, 458 U.S. 1301,
1302 (1982) (Powell, J., in chambers)). Justice Brennan's opinion in chambers in Rostker suggests
a fourth factor: the "relative harms to applicant and respondent, as well as the interests of the
public at large." Id. at 1308. But see Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 733 (1990) (per curiam)
(vacating stay of execution granted by federal court of appeals to allow time for competency
hearing because state court's determination of defendant's competency finding of fact which
bears presumption of correctness).
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Historically, when four members of the Court voted to grant certiorari,
another Justice automatically cast the fifth vote necessary to issue a stay. 92
Recently, however, the Court has denied stays of execution in cases in which
four Justices have granted certiorari. 93 This change in practice may dispel
the controversy regarding whether to grant stays of execution in cases being




Imposition of probation is governed by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984,2396 which applies to all defendants convicted of crimes committed on 'or
after November 1, 1987.z39 The Act treats probation as a sentence in its own
2392. See Autry v. Estelle, 464 U.S. 1, 2 (1983) (per curiam) ("Had appellant convinced four
members of this Court that certiorari would be granted on any of his claims, a stay would issue.").
Without the fifth vote to stay an execution, a capital case can be mooted by an execution before
the Court considers the case on the merits. Id. at 1134-35.
2393. Herrera v. Collins, 112 S. Ct. 1074 (1992) (mem.). After the Court's decision to grant
certiorari but to deny the stay, the state court in Texas stayed the execution. Er parte Herrera,
828 S.W.2d 8, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc); see also Hamilton v. Texas, 497 U.S. 1016
(1990) (mem.). In Hamilton, however, no stays were issued, and the prisoner was executed,
thereby mooting his claim. Id. at 1016-17 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting from denial of
stay); Hamilton v. Texas, 498 U.S. 908, 913 (1990) (Stevens & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in denial
of petition for writ of certiorari) (noting that petitioner's claim had been mooted by his
execution).
2394. A "hold" is an informal practice used to delay disposition of cases pending resolution of
similar cases that are before the Court on their merits. Only three votes are required to "hold" a
case. Watson v. Butler, 483 U.S. 1037, 1038 (1987) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.,
dissenting from denial of stay).
2395. The controversy arose because individual members of the Court held differing views as
to the significance of a "hold." Compare Straight v. Wainwright, 476 U.S. 1132, 1133 n.2 (1986)
(Powell, J., Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist & O'Connor, JJ., concurring in denial of stay) (cases
frequently held for reasons other than their merits; merits of "held" cases may not be affected by
disposition of case for which they were held) with id. at 1135 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun,
JJ., dissenting from denial of stay) (hold analogous to grant of certiorari and has implications as
to merits).
Over dissent, the Court has generally refused to grant a stay in "held" cases. For example, the
Court denied a stay of execution in Streetman v. Lynaugh, 484 U.S. 992 (1988), even though the
case was being held pending resolution of an identical challenge to Texas' death sentencing
scheme in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988). Streetman, 484 U.S. at 995-96; accord
Watson v. Butler, 483 U.S. 1037, 1037-38 (1987) (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting)
(stay of execution denied although four Justices voted to hold case pending resolution of
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988)); Straight, 476 U.S. at 1134-35 (Brennan, Marshall &
Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (stay of execution denied although four Justices voted to hold case
pending resolution of Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986)).
2396. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987-2031 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586; 28 U.S.C. §§
991-998 (1988)). The federal courts' authority to impose a sentence of probation is confured
solely by statute. Affronti v. U.S., 350 U.S. 79, 83 (1955).
2397. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 235(a)(1), 98 Stat. 1987, 2031,
reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3551 note (1988); see U.S. v. Rewald, 835 F.2d 215, 216 (9th Cir. 1987)
(probationer's motion for review under Sentencing Reform Act properly denied because sentenc-
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